SYSU Zhuhai Campus Philosophy Forum (IX)——A Coherence Argument for Monism

Organizer: Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)，Sun Yat-sen University

Topic: A Coherence Argument for Monism

Speaker: Itay Shani (Kyung Hee University)

Moderator: Jianhong CHEN (Professor, Sun Yat-sen University)

Time: May. 5^th., 3:00pm

Venue: R106, No.13 Administrative Building of Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai), SYSU

A Coherence Argument for Monism/ Itay Shani

Abstract: To "cohere" is to "stick together" (from the Latin root: co-haerere), and coherence designates the quality of sticking together. In its most general sense, then, coherence is a holistic feature of an ensemble of constitutive subcomponents which corresponds to the fact that elements of the ensemble exhibit unity and congruence in virtue of adhering to each other. In the present lecture, I argue that a proper understanding of the nature of coherence, and of the role played by coherence considerations in rendering the structure of experience intelligible, sustain a powerful argument in favor of the metaphysical position known as monism, and against dualism or, indeed, any substantive form of metaphysical pluralism.

    I begin with an illustration of the concept of coherence by considering its application in different domains of inquiry: in physics, in linguistics, and in philosophy. I then move on to the argument itself. The starting point of the argument is the simple observation that nature exemplifies a considerable degree of coherence, on multiple levels and scales. This appearance of coherence calls for an explanation, which is to say that it is a datum any metaphysical theory ought to accommodate. I then show that there are two rival explanatory strategies for dealing with the problem. The first strategy presupposes the notion of internal coherence, which, roughly speaking, is the idea that the order and coherence found in nature are, fundamentally, expressions of a spontaneous tendency on nature's behalf. The second strategy relies on the notion of external coherence, namely, on the idea that nature's coherence is, as it were, "imposed from above" — the result of sources of influence which are not themselves an integral part of the general flux of things (e.g., an Abrahamic God, eternal laws of nature, etc.). Next, I argue that adherence to the notion that nature's coherence is internal entails a commitment to metaphysical monism, viz. to the idea that, deep down, there is only one fundamental entity — the cosmos as a whole. Conversely, adherence to the notion that nature's coherence is external entails pluralism, namely, the view that, in the final account, the world is a plurality of wholly separate components. I conclude with an argument to the effect that the appeal to external coherence as an explanation for the coherence observed in the world around suffers from a cardinal deficiency: it solves one coherence problem at the price of introducing another one — this time at the interface between the phenomena of nature, and the organizing principles whose role it is to impose upon such phenomena order and regimentation. This completes the coherence argument for monism.