学术资讯｜全球正义工作坊第四十八讲：父母与子女之爱的本体论地位：时间性的视角

Global Justice Workshop (48th)

1

Organizer

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)

Sun Yat-sen University

2

Topic

On the Ontological Status of the Love between Parents and Children: From the Perspective of Temporality

3

Speaker

Xiangyuan CAI

Professor

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)

Sun Yat-sen University

4

Moderator

Paul PATTON

Emeritus Professor

Department of Philosophy

 University of New South Wales

5

Time

July 2nd, 2026

21:00-23:00

6

VOOV

420-828-719

ABSTRACT

In the Confucian tradition, the love between parents and children or family affection constitutes the foundation of human beings. This perspective contrasts sharply with Western tradition of individualism. In the Western philosophical tradition, philosophers also pay attention to and discuss family affection. Aristotle examined the issue of family affection when discussing the theme of "friendship" in his Nicomachean Ethics. Related discussions indicate that family affection are first and foremost one of many forms of friendship. Adam Smith regarded sympathy as the root of morality. In this context, he pointed out that family affection is a "habitual sympathy" caused by long-term cohabitation. This analysis also erases the difference between family affection and general friendship, without giving it its unique ontological status. Levinas regards ethics as the first philosophy and assigns a fundamental status to family affection. Levinas' analysis implicitly presupposes the existence of God as an absolute entity and his divine power. In the context of Chinese philosophy, the presentation of the ontological status of family affection is completely intra-worldliness, without the need to presuppose a unique power of absolute entity.

全球正义工作坊第（48）讲

1

主办

中山大学哲学系（珠海）

2

主题

父母与子女之爱的本体论地位：时间性的视角

3

主讲

蔡祥元

中山大学哲学系（珠海），教授

4

主持

Paul PATTON

新南威尔士大学哲学系，荣誉教授

5

时间

2026年7月2日

21:00-23:00

6

地点

腾讯会议

420-828-719

摘要

在儒家传统中，父母与子女之间的爱或家庭情感构成了人类的根基。这一观点与西方个人主义的传统形成了鲜明对比。实际上，在西方哲学传统中，哲学家们同样关注并讨论了家庭情感。亚里士多德在《尼各马可伦理学》讨论“友谊”的部分中，也考察了家庭情感的问题。亚里士多德的讨论表明家庭情感首先是诸多友谊形式中的一种。亚当·斯密认为同情是道德的根源，并据此认为家庭情感是一种由长期的共同生活所塑造的“习惯性同情”。这一分析同样抹平了家庭情感与一般友谊的差异，没有赋予其独特的本体论地位。列维纳斯将伦理学视为第一哲学，并赋予家庭情感以根本性的地位。列维纳斯的分析隐含地假定了上帝作为绝对实体和神圣权力的存在。在中国哲学语境中，对家庭情感本体论地位的呈现则完全是内在于世界的（intra-worldliness），无需预设绝对实体的独特权力。

来源｜哲珠新媒体

文稿｜杜陈

海报｜杨　琳

编辑｜姚元琦

初审｜韩　珩

审核｜卢　毅

审核发布｜屈琼斐