学术资讯｜比较哲学工作坊第五十三讲：宋明理学何以轻人欲——戴震的核心批判

Comparative Philosophy Workshop (53rd)

Organizer:

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai),

Sun Yat-sen University

Topic:

How Orthodox (Neo-Confucian) Morality Trivializes Human Desires: Dai Zhen’s Main Argument(Virtual)

Speaker:

Justin TIWALD, 

Professor, 

Department of Philosophy,

University of Hong Kong

Moderator:

Jun-Hyeok KWAK,

Professor,

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai),

Sun Yat-sen University

Time:

May 13th, 2026

10:00-12:00

VOOV:

495-236-253

ABSTRACT:

Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724-1777) is famous for many innovative ideas, but most turn on what I call his “main argument for countenancing human desires.” According to Dai, there is a set of contested desires called “human desires” (renyu 人欲), which are ethically problematic by the lights of the moral orthodoxy of his time (the longstanding, mainstream ethical views shaped by “Song Confucian” thinkers like Zhu Xi 朱熹) but are in fact important constituents of virtuous character. Because of the moral epistemology and appeal to metaphysical grounds presupposed by the moral orthodoxy, adherents to the orthodoxy “trivialize” or “treat lightly” these human desires. And Dai proposes that there is a better moral epistemology and metaethics (his own and Mengzi’s) which doesn’t trivialize them. The most notable effect of trivializing human desires is to neglect the basic interests or welfare of ordinary people. The paper that I will present is my attempt to offer the first close reading and careful assessment of his argument that orthodox (Zhu Xi-style) Neo-Confucianism trivializes human desires in this way.  

As I attempt to show, Dai points to five ways in which mainstream morality and orthodox Neo-Confucianism trivialize desires that should be regarded as much weightier for purposes of moral judgment and moral assessment. This then amounts to an important disagreement with orthodox Confucians like Zhu Xi 朱熹, despite some ambiguities in Zhu’s views about the ethical status of the desires in question. Two significant points of disagreement between Dai and Zhu are these: first, what to do with desires that are contingent in the sense that they have no direct ethical rationale or justification (they’re just accidents of human psychology and human nature); second, whether we should think of virtues and other ethical norms as improvements upon our contingent desires or as having grounds entirely independent of those desires. Insofar as deep disagreements about these issues persist between Dai and orthodox Neo-Confucianism, Dai is right to say that the orthodoxy trivializes human desires to bad effect. Furthermore, his main argument could be enlisted to criticize a wide array of metaethical views that share some of Zhu Xi’s core commitments, including popular ways of thinking of morality today.

比较哲学工作坊第（五十三）讲

主办：

中山大学哲学系（珠海）

主题：

宋明理学何以轻人欲——戴震的核心批判（线上）

主讲：

Justin TIWALD（田史丹），

香港大学哲学系，教授

主持：

Jun-Hyeok KWAK（郭峻赫），

中山大学哲学系（珠海），教授

时间：

2026年5月13日

10:00-12:00

地点：

腾讯会议

495-236-253

摘要：

戴震（1724-1777）以众多创新思想而著称，但其中多数都围绕着我称之为他的“为人欲辩护的核心论证”而展开。据戴震所言，存在一组具有争议的欲望——人欲（human desires）。从其所处时代的道德正统来看（即由朱熹等“宋儒”思想家塑造的长期主流伦理观），这些欲望在伦理上是有问题的；但实际上，它们是德性品格的重要组成部分。由于道德正统所预设的道德认知论及其对形而上学基础的依赖，其追随者便“轻忽”（trivialize）或“轻视”人欲。而戴震则提出，存在一种更优的道德认识论与元伦理学（即他本人的和孟子的）不会轻忽人欲。轻忽人欲最显著的后果，便是漠视普通人的基本利益与福祉。本文旨在首次对戴震“正统（朱熹式）新儒家轻忽人欲”这一论断进行细致解读和审慎评估。

正如我试图阐明的，戴震指出主流道德和正统新儒家在五个方面轻忽了人欲，而这些欲望本应在道德判断和评估中被赋予更为重要的地位。这便构成了他与朱熹等正统儒者的重要分歧，尽管朱熹对相关欲望之伦理地位的看法不无暧昧之处。戴震与朱熹的两大分歧点在于：其一，如何处置那些偶然的欲望，亦即并无直接伦理依据、仅为人类心理与本性之偶然产物的欲望；其二，我们是否应将美德和其他伦理规范视作对我们偶然欲望的改进，抑或认为这些规范之依据完全独立于那些欲望。就戴震与正统新儒学在这些议题上的深刻分歧而言，戴震指称正统轻忽人欲而造成不良影响的论断是正确的。此外，他的主要论证可被援引以批评诸多与朱熹核心主张相契合的元伦理学观点，包括当今流行的道德思维方式。

来源｜哲珠新媒体

文稿｜卢睿韬

海报｜杨　琳

编辑｜杨　琳

初审｜韩　珩

审核｜卢　毅

审核发布｜屈琼斐