学术资讯｜哲学前沿问题讲座系列第十一讲：同感的实行：论一种同感行动理论

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主题

ENACT EMPATHY:TOWARDS A THEORY OF EMPATHIC ACTION

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主讲

罗志达

中山大学哲学系(珠海)教授

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时间

2025年4月28日  8:55-11:50

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地点

中山大学珠海校区海琴六号 A486

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讲座简介

On a mainstream cognitivist account, empathy amounts to an epistemic understanding of another’s mental states and does not inherently lead to moral actions – such as helping or caring for others in need (i.e., sympathizing with them). Thus, to sympathize with others, empathy must first provide a cognitive foundation, enabling us to grasp their circumstances. However, an additional motivational factor is required, such as a concern-based construal – a quasi-judgment or belief that individuals in distress need aid to avert imminent harm. On this account, empathy and sympathy are distinct in kind: empathy is cognitive, while sympathy is motivated by factors beyond empathy itself.

In this talk, I argue that this conceptual separation between empathy and sympathy is too tenuous to adequately account for moral action. By relegating empathy to a purely epistemic role, the mainstream account underestimates its motivational significance while overestimating the force of cognitive construals. Drawing on Husserl, I contend that empathic perception carries a normative dimension – it imposes on the perceiver an “ought” of response. Through the example of an addressive gesture (e.g., a cry for help), I demonstrate that social perception transcends mere recognition of expressivity and it inherently inclines us toward responsive action for others. Importantly, this framework illuminates Mencius’ account of empathy, particularly his famous thought experiment of “seeing a child on the verge of falling into a well,” suggesting empathy itself can motivate moral response without requiring extrinsic factors like construals.

来源｜哲珠新媒体

海报｜黄万豪

编辑｜易芳婷

初审｜韩　珩

审核｜卢　毅

审核发布｜屈琼斐