学术资讯|哲珠科技哲学论坛第十三讲:Virtue, Luck, and Safety

Virtue, Luck, and Safety

发布人:韩珩
主题
Virtue, Luck, and Safety
活动时间
-
活动地址
中山大学珠海校区海琴六号A542会议室
主讲人
赵斌 北京大学哲学系(宗教学系)助理教授
主持人
王华平 中山大学哲学系(珠海)教授

 

 

题目

Virtue, Luck, and Safety

 

主讲

赵   斌 北京大学哲学系(宗教学系) 助理教授

 

主持

王华平 中山大学哲学系(珠海)教授

 

评议

赖国伟 中山大学哲学系(珠海)博士后

 

主办

中山大学哲学系(珠海)

 

时间

2023年10月13日15: 00点

 

地点

中山大学珠海校区 海琴六号A542

 

 

主讲人介绍

 

 

 

斌,北京大学哲学系(宗教学系)助理教授,加州大学尔湾校区哲学博士。 其主要研究领域为认识论,具体研究方向为知识的分析、模态认识论、德性认识论、认识运气、认识闭合以及认识辩护的结构等,次要研究领域为认知科学哲学以及心灵哲学。 曾在 Ergo、 American Philosophical Quarterly、Philosophy、Philosophia等国际著名哲学期刊发表论文十篇。

 

讲座内容简介

According to robust virtue epistemology, a belief amounts to knowledge if and only if the subject believes the truth because of the exercise of cognitive ability. It has been argued that the satisfaction of the virtue condition does not suffice for the elimination of knowledge-precluding luck. Therefore, robust virtue epistemology falls short of anti-luck epistemology. Drawing on the idea that cognitive success depends on ability and luck in a gradient way rather than a rigid way, it is argued in this paper that knowledge is achieved just in case cognitive success sufficiently depends more on ability than on luck in the sense that the exercise of cognitive ability significantly enhances the modal profile of the target belief relative to the modal profile of a belief in the target proposition formed by sheer luck. Robust virtue epistemology understood in this way is also a kind of anti-luck epistemology because the satisfaction of the virtue condition ensures a kind of safety condition which, in turn, helps to eliminate luckily true beliefs from the realm of knowledge.

 

来源|哲珠新媒体

海报|史争辉

编辑|霍雅萱

初审|韩    珩

审核|卢    毅

审核发布|屈琼斐