现象学工作坊丨情感、爱与人格

Can Wishes be Fulfilled? ——Husserl’s Evolving Answer.

This paper explores the evolution of Husserl’s understanding of how feelings can be true or false. That is, I investigate how he transforms his account of how feeling intentions are fulfilled. This is accomplished in two steps. First, I discuss how Husserl developed his theory of the fulfillment of feeling-intentions in his 1901 Logische Untersuchungen. Second, I examine how he revised that account in a 1910 manuscript, entitled, “Erfüllt sich der Wunsch in der Freude?”. By uncovering the ways Husserl changed his theory, the essay reveals that he had a much richer phenomenology of feelings than has yet been accounted for.

Authors such as Dan Zahavi and Michael Wheeler have stated that ‘phenomenology’ is a ‘personal level’ theory. I examine if the association of these two concepts is well motivated. I show that the ‘personal level’ is a term stemming from the analytic tradition that denotes a level of explanation. I then provide Davidson’s rational/intentional account of the personal level and analyse areas where there is convergence and divergence with Husserlian phenomenology. My conclusion is that, Husserl would endorse Davidson’s claim that mental and physical accounts are merely different descriptions of the same event, and that the physical is ontologically prior to the mental. Yet, this does not mean that personal level explanations can be collapsed into physical ones, as the mental has a conceptual and explanatory priority and autonomy.

Husserl's early ethics devoted itself to ensuring the legitimacy of the ought by establishing the objectivity of value and its order. But the discovery of absolute value threw Husserl's law of value comparison into a quagmire. For there is no quantitative distinction between absolute values, how can these values be compared? This forces Husserl to rethink the foundation of his ethics. As a result, he had to give up his categorical imperative inherited from Brentano, and put forward a new categorical imperative: act from the pure conscience (Gewissen), forever only for pure love (the love in you or in others) will give your permission. The difference between the two categorical imperatives is enormous. What kind of theoretical dilemma is behind Husserl’s change, and how Husserl dealt with these difficulties, would be the issues this paper to investigate. 

本讲探讨胡塞尔关于此论题的思考进路：情感如何能够是正确或错误的。即，我将探索胡塞尔如何转变他对情感意向被充实的理解。这将通过两步进行。首先，我讨论胡塞尔在1901年的《逻辑研究》中的情感意向的充实理论。其次，我将检验在1910年的手稿《愿望是否在快乐中充实？》中胡塞尔如何修正了他的解释。通过揭示胡塞尔修正自己的理论，我将表明，胡塞尔的情感伦理学仍然需要被更充分地研究和解释。

扎哈维和麦克.维勒已经开始提出现象学是一种人格层次上的理论。我检查这两个概念之间的联系是否是有积极意义的。我表明，人格层次是一个源于分析哲学传统的术语，这意味着一个解释的层次。我接着会提供戴维森人格层次上的理性/意向的解释，并分析其与胡塞尔的现象学的一致和分歧。我的结论是，胡塞尔会支持戴维森的看法：精神的和物理的解释仅仅是对同一个事件的不同描述，并且物理的解释在本体论上优先于精神的解释。然而，这并不意味着人格层次上的解释还原为物理的解释，正如精神具有概念的和解释的优先性和自主性。

胡塞尔早期伦理学致力于完成这样一个构想：通过建立价值及其秩序的客观性，来确保 “应当”的合法性。但绝对价值的发现让胡塞尔的价值比较法则陷入了困境。绝对价值之间没有量的区别，这些价值之间如何能够进行比较？这迫使胡塞尔重新思考伦理学的基础，其结果是，他不得不放弃他从布伦塔诺那里继承的绝对命令，而提出新的——爱的绝对命令：要纯粹，出于纯粹良心（Gewissen）来行动，永远只对纯粹的爱（在你当中并且在他人当中的爱）给予你的实践的赞同。这两种绝对命令的差异是巨大的。胡塞尔做出这种改变，其后隐含着怎样的理论困境，这些困难胡塞尔又是如何应对的，本文试图来着手处理这样的一些问题。