学术资讯｜政治哲学工作坊第六十三讲：柏拉图和G. E. 摩尔论善和他者的善

Organizer:

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)

Sun Yat-sen University

Topic:

Plato and G. E. Moore on Good and the Good of Others（Virtual）

Speaker:

Christopher BOBONICH

Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University

Moderator:

Jun-Hyeok KWAK

Professor, Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai), Sun Yat-sen University

Time:

September 26th, 19:00-21:00

Voov:

694-437-107

ABSTRACT:

The topic of this paper is Plato’s view about the nature of the good and the relation between one’s own good and the good of others. To help understand Plato’s views, I draw upon those of G. E. Moore, especially those in the Principia Ethica . Both Moore and Plato think that non-relational goodness (absolute goodness, good simpliciter) has a certain kind of priority with respect to relational goodness (what is good for a thing, what benefits it). In the first part of this paper, I try to show that for Plato non-relational goodness is prior to relational goodness, in particular, that facts about non-relational goodness ground facts about relational goodness. Although Moore’s position on non-relational goodness does not entail his ‘Ideal Consequentialism’, as we shall see, in Chapter 5 of PE Moore moves very quickly from one to the other.  On the contrary, Plato is a Rational Eudaimonist, that is, he holds that for every person the ultimate end of all her rational actions is her own (greatest) happiness (eudaimonia) or well-being. Then I examine the relation between Plato’s commitment to the priority of non-relational goodness and his privileging of the individual point of view insofar as he’s a Rational Eudaimonist. Through this examination, I will answer to the question of whether the theology of Laws 10 at last Plato’s commitment to non-relational goodness leads him to reject or downgrade the ethical significance of relational goodness and the associated privileging of the individual point of view.

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摘要:

本文探讨了柏拉图对于善的本质、属己的善和他者的善的关系的看法。为了更好地理解柏拉图的观点，我参考了G. E. 摩尔的观点，尤其是他在《伦理学原理》（Principia Ethica）中的相关论述。 摩尔和柏拉图都认为，非关系性的善（绝对善、纯粹善）相对于关系性的善（对某物是好的、有益于某物）具有某种优先性。 在本文的第一部分，我试图表明，对于柏拉图而言，非关系性的善优先于关系性的善，特别是非关系性的善的事实构成了关系性的善的基础。 尽管摩尔关于非关系性的善的立场并不必然导向他的“理想结果主义”，但正如我们在《伦理学原理》第五章中所见的那般，他很快就从前者转向了后者。 相反，柏拉图是一位理性幸福论者(Rational Eudaimonist)，即他认为对每个人来说，该人所有的理性行动的最终目的是其自身的最大幸福(Eudaimonia)或福祉。 然后，我探讨了柏拉图对于非关系性善的优先性之承诺和他作为理性幸福论者对于个体视角的重视之间的关系。 借助这一探讨，我将回答，在《法律篇》第十卷的神学中，柏拉图对非关系性善的承诺是否最终导致他拒斥或者降低了关系性的善的伦理意义及与之相关的对个体视角的重视。