学术资讯｜哲珠科技哲学论坛第十八讲：The Self is A Substance

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)， Sun Yat-sen University

The Self is A Substance 

Ivan V. Ivanov, 

Associate Professor,

School of Politics and Law, 

Capital Normal University 

WANG Huaping,

Professor,

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai),

Sun Yat-sen University

ITAY Shani,

Professor,

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai),

Sun Yat-sen University

May 31 2024, 15:00-17:00 

A486, Haiqin No.6 Building, Sun Yat-sen University Zhuhai campus

Recently, the notion of a self seems to have dispersed in a plurality. Philosophers now speak freely of biological, psychological, phenomenal, rational, narrative, and social selves. The dispersal suggests a structure with an isolable core and superadded layers. Some call the core a minimal self, others think some further layers are needed for a true self. But the opposing sides largely agree about the underlying metaphysics, so their differences seem to be predominantly verbal. I want to propose a radical alternative: a synthetic approach to the self, on which a single entity possesses, grounds and unifies the different aspects-erroneously called selves. I do so by arguing for two kinds of synthesis: a synchronic one-fusing the biological and phenomenological aspects of the self, and a diachronic one-fusing the minimal and the sophisticated psychological aspects of the self. I then argue that the notion of an Aristotelian substance and the hylomorphic metaphysics surrounding it are crucial to the prospects of the attempted syntheses. 

Ivan V. Ivanov 副教授

首都师范大学政法学院

王华平 教授

中山大学哲学系（珠海）

 ITAY Shani 教授

中山大学哲学系（珠海）

最近，自我的概念似乎变得多元。 哲学家们现在自由地谈论生物、心理、现象、理性、叙事和社会自我的概念。 多元性暗示了一个具有可剥离的核心和附加层的结构。 有些人称这个核心为最小自我，而其他人认为真正的自我需要一些进一步的层次。 但是，相对立的一方在根本的形而上学问题上基本上是一致的，所以他们之间的差异似乎主要是言辞上的。 我想提出一个激进的替代观点，即自我的综合进路。它认为，一个拥有、底定和统一了不同方面的单一实体，被错误地称之为自我。我将论证有两种综合： 一种是共时综合，它融合了自我的生物学和现象学方面； 另一种是历时综合，它融合了最小自我和复杂的心理学方面。接着我将论证，亚里士多德式的实体概念及其相关的形式质料形而上学对这种综合的前景是至关重要的。

来源｜哲珠新媒体

海报｜李颖妍

编辑｜霍雅萱

初审｜韩　珩

审核｜卢　毅

审核发布｜屈琼斐