学术资讯｜哲学前沿问题系列讲座第八讲：就是这样——虚构与真实之间的比较

摘要

虚构与真实之间的比较（以下简称“虚实比较”）衍生了不少有趣的哲学问题。 例如，如果科学模型和虚构人物并不存在，那么诸如“本地的兔子比洛特卡-伏特拉模型中的兔子有较低的存活率”，“艾伦戴的帽子就是戴福尔摩斯所戴的那一款帽子”等句子的意义是什么？ 我们为什么可以从虚构中学习到有关真实世界的真理？ 不少学者认为“虚实比较”之所以有效，是因为它们展示了某些相关属性，并表示它们所指的真实物件有那些属性。 但是，过去有关“虚实比较”的分析都不能保留这想法的自然性和吸引力。 在本次讲座中，我将论证“虚实比较”涉及一种可延迟的导出。 在对话中，我们之所以接受“虚实比较”，是因为它们能为我们提供足够好的答案，而且我们相信我们能从中导出只关于真实世界的真理。 但与之前的许多观点不同的是，这种观点建议对话者不必在对话中进行导出，因为“导出”这过程费时、争议性大，且不一定与对话的目的相关。

Abstract

Comparisons between the actual and the fictional (hereafter 'transfictional comparisons') raise interesting philosophical questions. If theoretical scientific models and fictional characters do not exist, then why does it make sense to compare actual rabbit populations with hypothetical rabbit populations and actual persons with Sherlock Holmes? How do such comparisons communicate truths? Authors have zoomed in on the thought that transfictional comparisons work because they demonstrate certain relevant properties, which are in turn predicated of the actual objects mentioned. But this thought has been implemented in ways that dilute its naturalness and appeal. In this paper, I argue that transfictional comparisons work because they involve a delayable exportation. We accept transfictional comparisons as true in a conversation because they are effective demonstrative devices that provide us with good enough answers to our inquiries, and because we trust that we can export from them truths that suit our ontological tastes. But, unlike a host of previous views, this view recommends that exportation need not be carried out in the midst of a conversation, because the exercise is often costly, contentious, and irrelevant to the aim of conversation.