学术资讯｜全球正义讲座第三十四讲：国际赔偿的悖论

Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai)，

Sun Yat-sen University

Adam Lerner

Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Lowell

Jun-Hyeok KWAK

Professor, Department of Philosophy (Zhuhai), Sun Yat-sen University

For centuries, international reparations were commonly exacted as a form of victor’s justice after war. Following World War II, however, the bitter legacy of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and West Germany’s proactive efforts to compensate victims of Nazism shifted this practice, ushering in a novel moral economy of international reparations that has inspired transnational movements to this day. Yet, while recent decades have seen increases in interstate aid payments and official apologies, international reparations are less frequent, and programs often fail to achieve their objectives. This paper builds a new theory to explain this lacklustre record, arguing international reparations face a central paradox relating to finality. Though, in theory, international reparations are designed to close a historical chapter, by opening issues of traumatic memory to international debate they often achieve the opposite effect. The international system lacks tools to ensure finality occurs and thus reparations agreements typically inspire a cascade of further claims. As evidence, we examine three historical cases of both international reparations’ occurrence and rejection: Germany’s reparations for Nazi-era crimes, the UNCC formed following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and the reparations negotiated but removed from the 1973 Paris Peace Accords. Employing process tracing methods on archival documents, we demonstrate in each case how this paradox framed political action and, further, how it provides a more complete explanation than alternatives in existing literature.

Adam Lerner

马萨诸塞大学洛厄尔分校政治学系副教授

Jun-Hyeok KWAK （郭峻赫）

中山大学哲学系（珠海）教授

几个世纪以来，国际赔偿通常被看作是战后胜利者正义的一种形式。 然而，在第二次世界大战之后，1919 年凡尔赛条约的令人痛苦的遗留问题和西德为补偿纳粹主义受害者所做的积极努力改变了这种惯例，引领了一种新的国际赔偿的道德经济，这种道德经济直到今天仍在激发跨国运动。 然而，尽管近几十年来国际援助款项和官方致歉有所增加，但国际赔偿却不那般频繁，而且国际赔偿项目往往无法实现其目标。 本讲构建一个新理论来解释这一令人感到乏味的历史，并指出国际赔偿面临着一个关于历史终结的重要悖论。 虽然从理论上讲，国际赔偿旨在通过让创伤记忆的议题进入国际辩论来终结一段历史时期，但这样往往会适得其反。 国际体系缺乏确保历史终结点出现的手段，因此赔偿协议通常会引发一连串进一步的索赔。 作为证据，我们研究了三个国际赔偿发生和被拒绝的历史案例： 德国对纳粹时期罪行的赔偿，伊拉克入侵科威特后成立的联合国赔偿委员会（UNCC），以及通过谈判但在1973年巴黎和平协定中删除的赔偿。 通过对档案文件使用过程追踪法，我们在每个案例中都表明了这个悖论是如何塑造政治行动的，并进一步表明，它如何提供了一个比现有文献中的可选方案更完整的解释。