中山大学哲学系（珠海）研究生前沿讲座系列第十六讲：Explaining the Laws of Appearance

The contents of sensory experiences seem subject to distinctive restrictions. For example, unlike thoughts, it seems no perceptual experience (or even imagery) could represent an inconsistent or a vastly indeterminate situation. Such restrictions have been called the Laws of Appearance, and accounting for them seems impossible for those taking experiences to be representations. Might alternative, relational views of the nature of experience have an advantage in this regard? In particular, might a view of sensory experience centred around a naïve realist account of veridical perceptual experiences do better in accounting for the Laws? It may seem that the naïve-centric view runs into the same problem as representationalism when it comes to hallucinations. I argue that this is not the case. But there is real problem for the view, coming from perceptual illusions. However, it, too, can be solved. To that effect, I show that a naïve realist account of illusory experiences distinctively predicts absolute limits on the degree to which an object’s appearance may distort its intrinsic character.

Recommended reading: 

Adam Pautz,

“Experiences Are Representations” in Nanay (ed.) (2017), 

Current Controversies in Philosophy of Perception. Routledge.

Key topics:

-what is Naïve Realism: 23-24

-what is Intentionalism 

(Representationalism): 34-36

-The Laws of Appearance: 36-39

中山大学哲学系（珠海）

研究生前沿讲座系列介绍：

本课程采取系列讲座形式，内容涉及哲学的不同学科方向和研究领域，邀请本系大部分教学科研人员参与，能够充分展示本系哲学学科的国际化、跨学科等优势与特色。本课程旨在通过各位教师结合其新近研究成果，带领学生了解和探讨目前外国哲学、中国哲学、伦理学与政治哲学、美学、科技哲学、逻辑学等领域的经典问题与前沿动态，以丰富同学的专业知识，扩展同学的学术视野，培养同学的研究意识。